

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 018

INFO DOD

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USSCC GENEVA 5162

EXDIS/SCC

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: COMMISSIONER USTINOV'S SCC STATEMENT (SCC-006)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE BY COMMISSIONER
USTINOV AT MEETING OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE SCC,
SEPTEMBER 27, 1973.

MR. COMMISSIONER:

DURING THE FIRST SESSION CERTAIN USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED
ON PREPARATION OF THE DRAFT PROTOCOLS AND ATTACHED PROCEDURES
GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICA-
TION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS WELL AS FOR ABM
SYSTEMS. THE DOCUMENTS PREPARED IN THE WORKING GROUP WERE
PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSIONERS FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION.

ALL THESE DOCUMENTS WERE CAREFULLY STUDIED DURING THE
RECESS IN SCC ACTIVITY.

THE SOVIET COMPONENT OF THE SCC CONSIDERS THE WORDING OF
THE DRAFT PROTOCOLS AND OF THE CORRESPONDING PROCEDURES, IN
RESPECT TO WHICH GENERAL MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT AT THE
WORKING GROUP LEVEL WAS REACHED IN THE COURSE OF THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE SCC, TO BE BASICALLY ACCEPTABLE (WITH SOME

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MINOR CORRECTIONS).

WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT PROTOCOLS AND CORRESPONDING PROCEDURES PROVIDE A GOOD BASIS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS IN WORKING OUT THE PROTOCOLS AND ATTACHED PROCEDURES ON QUESTIONS OF DISMANTLING AND REPLACEMENT OF BOTH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ABM SYSTEMS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EARLIER UNDERSTANDING, DURING THE SECOND SESSION OF THE SCC WE ARE TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE AFOREMENTIONED PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE THIS WORK.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT SUCCESS HERE DEPENDS ABOVE ALL ON HOW FULLY WE WILL BE ABLE TO OVERCOME THE DIFFERENCES WHICH CAME TO LIGHT DURING THE LAST SESSION OF THE SCC WITH RESPECT TO A NUMBER OF ISSUES HAVING SUBSTANTIVE SIGNIFICANCE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ARRIVING AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.MMV

AT THE END OF THE LAST SESSION I EXPRESSED MY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ISSUES WHICH FORMED THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR DIFFERENCES. WE ASSUME THAT DURING THE RECESS THESE CONSIDERATIONS WERE CAREFULLY STUDIED AND TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE U.S. SIDE. THE PAST DISCUSSIONS SHOW THAT BOTH SCC COMPONENTS SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE PROCEDURES WE ARE DEVELOPING TO GOVERN REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS WELL AS FOR ABM SYSTEMS, MUST FACILITATE STRICT COMPLIANCE BY THE SIDES WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS WELL AS UNDER THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS.

BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT, WITH RESPECT TO ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO ENSURE THAT LAUNCHERS AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES ARE PUT IN A CONDITION THAT PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR USE FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS OR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, RESPECTIVELY. PROCEDURES FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF ABM SYSTEMS SHOULD EVIDENTLY BE APPROACHED IN A CORRESPONDING MANNER.

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AT THE SAME TIME (AND I THINK THE US SIDE ALSO AGREES) SUCH A TASK MUST BE CARRIED OUT AT MINIMUM EFFORT AND COST. CAREFUL STUDY OF THE US PROPOSALS TABLED AT THE LAST SESSION OF THE SCC SHOWS THAT THEY DID NOT DULY REFLECT THIS ASPECT. A WHOLE SERIES OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE US COMPONENT OF THE WORKING GROUP, ARE NOT DICTATED BY NECESSITY AND ARE SUPERFLUOUS.

THE SIDES MUST BE ABLE TO MAKE USE OF CERTAIN FACILITIES
AT LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCH SITES, AFTER DISMANTLING OF THE EQUIP-
MENT, AND OF SUBMARINES, AFTER DISMANTLING OF THE LAUNCHERS,
FOR OTHER PURPOSES NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO. THIS ALSO APPLIES
TO FACILITIES AT ABM LAUCH SITES AND ABM RADARS WHICH, AFTER
COMPLETION OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION ACTIVITIES PROVIDED

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FOR BY AGREED PROCEDURES, COULD ALSO BE USED FOR PURPOSES NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY. IT SEEMS
TO US THAT THIS IS OF EQUAL INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT BOTH THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS QUITE PRECISELY AND
UNAMBIGUOUSLY SPECIFY THAT VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE IS TO BE
CARRIED OUT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE AGREEMENTS CON-
CLUDED PROVIDE FOR SPECIAL MEASURES ENSURING THAT NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE DULY EFFECTIVE. THE CONFIDENCE OF THE
SIDES IN DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS WILL ALSO BE
ENHANCED BY THE ACTIVITY OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE ABM
TREATY, THE MEMORANDUM OF DECEMBER 21, 1972, AND THE SCC
REGULATIONS. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO NEED TO INTRODUCE INTO THE
SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION ANY KIND OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES NOT PROVIDED

FOR BY THE TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, INCLUDING ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS FOR THE SCC, WHICH WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR OR REPLACE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

IT IS PRECISELY THESE CONSIDERATIONS THAT DETERMINE THE APPROACH OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO THE QUESTION OF NOTIFICATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT NOTIFICATION TWICE ANNUALLY, REFLECTING THE STATUS AS OF THE BEGINNING OF EACH REGULAR SESSION OF THE SCC IN REGARD TO
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DISMANTLING ACTIVITIES OR DESTRUCTION, AS WELL AS REPLACEMENT, IS FULLY ADEQUATE IN TERMS OF ENSURING CONFIDENCE FOR THE SIDES THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ARE BEING COMPLIED WITH.

AS CONCERNS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, NOTIFICATION SHALL CONTAIN INFORMATION FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS ON THE NUMBER OF DISMANTLED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ON REPLACED SUBMARINES, AS WELL AS ON THE NUMBER OF SUCH LAUNCHERS REPLACED BY LAUNCHERS ON MODERN SUBMARINES DURING THAT PERIOD. CORRESPONDING INFORMATION COULD ALSO BE PROVIDED WITH RESPECT TO ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS, WHICH ARE BEING DISMANTLED OR REPLACED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY.

WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE BEGINNING OF SEA TRIALS OF REPLACEMENT SLBM SUBMARINES QUITE PRECISELY DETERMINES THE TIME WHEN DISMANTLING OF OLDER ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM SUBMARINES AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY NEW LAUNCHERS ON MODERN SUBMARINES IS INITIATED; THEREFORE THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE BEGINNING OR INDIVIDUAL FURTHER STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION OF REPLACEMENT SLBM SUBMARINES.

AT THE SAME TIME THE SOVIET PROPOSALS PROVIDE THAT EACH SIDE MAY ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS ADD OTHER INFORMATION TO THE NOTIFICATIONS IF IT CONSIDERS SUCH INFORMATION NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE ABM TREATY.

MR. COMMISSIONER,

THE SOVIET COMPONENT OF THE SCC IS READY TO CONTINUE THE WORK OF PREPARING AGREED DRAFT TEXTS OF THE PROTOCOLS AND ATTACHED PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF. IS SO DOING WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER PROCEDURES FOR BOTH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND ABM SYSTEMS.
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